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In March of 1861, as high hopes for a peaceful resolution of the 
sectional conflict faltered, few Americans anticipated British intervention in 
struggles with the South. Most Americans heard Britain's proclaimed 
interest in steering clear of the conflict. Congress rarely mentioned England 
when discussing the conflict. Secretary of State Seward believed the conflict 
did not concern other nations. Even President Lincoln underestimated 
English interest, seeming more concerned with solving the Chicago Post 
Office controversy than with preparing his new Minister to England with pre-
travel instructions. I 
But Lincoln had reason to worry. If anyone outside the United States 
could help secure Southern victory and subsequent independence it was the 
British. They had what the South needed--a latent rivalry with the 
commercial North, the best navy in the world, shipyards and technology to 
manufacture the best war vessels, and the ability to bestow official 
recognition on the South. Short of granting the latter, however, Britain could 
not openly aid the South without breaking neutrality laws. Realizing this, on 
March 16, Confederate President Jefferson Davis sent the first Confederate 
emissaries to England, their prime diplomatic objective to win official 
recognition. The Union's primary diplomatic task, conversely, immediately 
became preventing foreign recognition of the Confederacy. 
Unfortunately for the Union, before Lincoln's foreign minister, Charles 
Francis Adams, even arrived in England, the first step towards Confederate 
, Duberman, Martin. Charles Francis Adams : 1807-1886. (California: 
Stanford University Press, 1960), pp. 256-57. In route to England, Adams 
stopped in Washington D.C. to receive instructions from the President. 
When Adams thanked Lincoln for the post, Lincoln responded, 11 You are not 
my choice. You are Seward's man. 11 (Referring to Secretary of State W.H. 
Seward) Lincoln then turned to Seward and began discussing the Chicago 
Post Office controversy. 
recognition took place. On May 13, Britain passed her Declaration of 
Neutrality, granting belligerent rights to the Confederacy. While this did not 
recognize the South's independence, it did recognize the South as a separate 
entity from the North. The North was outrage<L sure that official recognition 
would follow. 
2 
When Adams arrived in Liverpool on the evening of the thirteenth, he 
learned of the Declaration and immediately began his first diplomatic task--
preventing this fait accompli from becoming the first in a series of moves 
toward recognizing the South. On May 16, he visited the Queen, announcing 
his intent to work together with Britain for the good of both countries. Two 
days later, he met with Lord John Russell, head of the British Foreign Office. 
The meeting was successful. Although gaining no ground on the neutrality 
issue, each gained the other's respect. This cordial beginning set the stage for 
amicability that characterized their relationship throughout the war.2 
Southern victory hinged on British martime aid. Without it, the South's 
hope of breaking the Northern blockade remained dismal. And without 
breaking the Northern blockade, foreign recognition and subsequent 
independence was remote.3 Before England would recognize the 
Confederacy, the South needed to show its cause to be viable. England 
would not risk officially siding with the Confederacy without assurance of 
plausible victory. 
2 Duberman, pp. 263-64. Also, E.D. Adams, Great Britain and the American 
Civil War. (New York: Russell and Russell., Inc., Vol., 1958L p.81. 
Adams 's "cool" demeanor mixed with his distinguished reserve was similar 
to Russell's own temperament. The similarity engendered mutual respect 
and made Adams a particularly effective personality to deal with Russell. 
30n April 19, 1861 Lincoln announced a blockade of Southern ports much 
to the consternation of both Britain and the Confederacy. 
For the first two years of the war, adequate assurance eluded England. 
Even the untimely Trent Affair and the astounding success ofBritish-made, 
Confederate-bought blockade runners failed to induce official abandonment 
of Britain's neutral stance.4 Too much was at stake, Adams steadily 
reminded the Palmerston government, for Britain to risk Confederate 
recognition. 
While avoiding official recognition, however, Britain did aid the South 
through the manufacture of war vessels. British sale to the South of 
blockade-busters vexed Adams throughout the war. Although not destroying 
the Northern blockade, superior British vessels weakened it and cost the 
Union millions of dollars. Confederate success on the seas not only 
endangered Union victory but boosted British economy and portended 
possible foreign recognition. 
3 
In the fall of 1863, the South hoped acquisition of two specific British 
vessels, the Laird rams, would tum the tide of battle enough to secure formal 
British recognition and subsequent intervention. If used, these ships, the most 
formidable to their day, would ruin the Northern blockade, strengthening 
Confederate resolve and providing England with impetus to enter the 
4 The two Confederate emissaries sent to England in March of 1861 were 
accomplishing little. In response/ Jefferson Davis sent two new agents to 
Europe: James Mason of Virginia and John Slidell of Louisiana. The North 
believed these men could justifiably be captured. So as Mason and Slidell 
departed in the British ship, Trent, a northern ship stopped the Trent and 
seized the two men. Outrage in England over stopping a neutral vessel led 
the Union to the brink of foreign war. Also, during the course of the war 
some nineteen blockade runners reached sea and destroyed over 250 Union 
vessels. 
4 
conflict. 5 Adams knew the ships could not become part of the southern fleet. 
They had to stay at port in Britain. 
Securing this fate required adroit diplomatic maneuvering. Adams's 
actions in the resultant Laird rams crisis represent just that. He used the 
greatest of tact, the harshest of words, and the best of undercover evidence to 
assure that the two ironclad rams, immensely more powerful than any ship to 
date, didn't see action against the North. His relentless correspondence and 
numerous meetings with government officials thwarted the South's best 
opportunity to use British vessels for the Confederate cause. His success was 
the acme of his career; the product of a life of quiet learning and active 
leadership; the climactic act in his distinguished life. 
I 
"Charles Francis Adams Minster to England" declared a March 19, 1861 
headline in the New York Times. President Lincoln's appointment of Adams 
"is considered here a most admirable one, and there is no doubt his popularity 
at London will equal that of his distinguished father at the same Court, long 
ago. "6 It was fitting that Adams be appointed to represent his country in time 
of crisis and hostility between the U.S. and Britain. His grandfather, John 
Adams, had negotiated peace with England in 1783 and traveled to England 
to represent America. Charles's father, John Quincy Adams, had also 
negotiated peace with England in 1812 and traveled to England as a 
representative of the United States. 
s Indications to this effect are plentiful in almost any work describing the 
Laird crisis. 
s New York Times, 19 March 1861, p. 1. 
On May 1, when Charles disembarked, he left for an England he last 
visited as a boy in 1817. During his forty-four years between visits, Adams 
built a distinguished career in Massachusetts as writer, lawyer, and political 
activist. These substantive years, preparing him for eminent success in 
foreign diplomacy, began in the shadows of his celebrated ancestors. 
Charles had a proud name to uphold. His grandfather was a patriot of 
the Revolution and the second president of the United States. His father was 
a longtime U.S. congressman from Massachusetts, and the sixth president of 
the United States. Both John and John Quincy were commanding, popular, 
self-confident, and formidable if diminutive political giants. Charles was the 
opposite. Subdued, unimposing, introverted, he often avoided public 
attention. But like his father and grandfather, he loved learning, and at age 
fourteen he entered school at Harvard. 
Five years later he began a three year engagement to Abigail Brooks. 
Their maniage in 1829, was one of three major events in Charles's life that 
prepared him for diplomatic success in England. He later told his son Brooks 
he would never have become anything if was not for his wife.? On his tenth 
anniversary, Charles wrote in his diary, "Perhaps of all my good fortune . . . 
my maniage was the greatest incident . . . it stimulated me in the right 
direction and prevented the preponderance of my constitutional shyness and 
indolence. "8 Indeed marriage profoundly affected Adams, nurturing a 
confident demeanor and tenacious spirit. 
While now more willing to involve himself in public affairs Adams still 
seemed affected by the pressure of becoming a "true" Adams. Unti11832, he 
continued to avoid public life, choosing a cahner and more subdued life 
7 Duberman, p.35. Based on Charles Francis Adams Diary, May 18, 1850. 
a C.F .A. Diary, September 4, 1839. Otd. in Duberman, p. 430. 
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writing for publications. In 1832 he entered the periphery of the political 
scene, attending conventions and writing with stronger political conviction. 
By 1838, Whigs in Quincy, Massachusetts offered him the nomination to the 
state legislature. He turned it down, twice. Finally in 1840, after relentless 
pressure from his friends, he agreed to run, "not because he believed it would 
contribute to his own happiness at all to enter public life. "9 
6 
Winning easily, he spent five years at the Massachusetts State 
Legislature gaining the reputation as a leader of the Whig party and an 
opponent of slavery. This victory and subsequent leadership marked the 
second great event preparing Adams for action in England. As congressman, 
he led a strong anti-slavery crusade, including several battles against Texas's 
admission as a slave state. In June, 1846, four months after his five-year-old 
son Arthur died, he began editorship of the Boston Whig. Soon Adams 
became head of the Conscience Whigs, a faction of Whigs especially opposed 
to slavery. 
Although Charles established a name for himself in Massachusetts, his 
father was still the more prominent Adams, returning to the U.S. Congress 
after one term as president. Somehow, the popularity and influence received 
by the previous two generations continued to elude Adams. In 1848, a rival 
political paper, the Boston Atlas, described Charles as "a man who lives upon 
the reputation as well as the wealth of his ancestors." 10 But that year he 
further carved out his own political niche by helping found the Free Soil party 
and running for Vice President on a ticket with former president Martin Van 
Buren. Although they lost to Zachary Taylor, the election marked a turning 
s C.F .A. Diary, October 28, 1840. Otd. in Duberman, p. 69. 
1o Boston Atlas, 1848. Otd. in Duberman, p. 154. 
point in Charles's career. It came after the third event that prepared him for 
political genius in England. 
Earlier that year, his father died, carting on Charles the sole 
responsibility for carrying the family's tradition of public service. While 
saddened by his father's death, he now stepped out from the shadow of his 
father's reputation. 
The next years of his life moved quickly, snowballing until his 
appointment as Foreign Minster to England. Between 1850 and 1856 Adams 
finished a ten volume biography of his grandfather, the Works of John 
Adams. In 1858 he was elected to the United States Congress. Chairing 
several committees, including the famous Committee of Thirty-Three which 
examined the fractured, perilous condition of the country, Adams soon 
became a respected member. And when Lincoln was elected president two 
years later, Adams was appointed Foreign Minster in England.ll 
A different Charles Francis Adams left for England on May 1. Father 
of five and patriarch of the entire Adams family, he worked now with a 
confidence, an "admirable self-restraint" and an" instinctive mastery of 
form."12 British Minster to Washington Lord Lyons described Adams as "a 
man of great independence of character, [possessing a] . . . very tenacious" 
reputation.13 Indeed, Adams was prepared to work in England, equipped 
with intellectual precision, imperturbable judgment, and tactful expression. 
7 
11 President Lincoln wanted William L. Dayton to serve as foreign minister to 
England. Charles Sumner, Massachusetts Senator, also wanted the 
appointment. At Secretary of State Seward 's urging, however, Adams won 
the appointment. 
12 Otd. in Adams, J.T. The Adams Family. (New York: Little, Brown and 
Co., 1958), p. 196. 
t3 Qtd. in Adams, E.D., Vol. 1, p.63. 
n 
English attitude toward America was hostile before Adams arrived, 
reflecting the disappointment over Lincoln's policy statement in his inaugural 
address on March 4: 
I have no purpose, directly or indirectly to interfere with the 
institution of slavery in the States where it exists. I believe 
I have no lawful right to do so, and I have no inclination to 
do so.l4 
Britain had officially opposed slavery since its 1833 abolition of the 
institution. For this reason, it had supported the Northern anti-slavery 
sentiment of earlier years. But with Lincoln's pronouncement, Britain 
assumed the war was not to be fought over the slavery question. Since 
slavery was not at stake in America, Britain felt free to view the impending 
conflict through commercial and capitalist eyes.15 
For England, legitimate concerns arose over the Northern blockade. 
With Southern ports inaccessible, British economic strength and trading 
privileges were precarious. England needed safe access to trade with their 
biggest trading partners.l6 On March 20 Lord Lyons told Seward: 
14 Lincoln's First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1861. Otd. in Adams, E.D., 
p.50. 
1s Adams, E. D., Vol. 1, p. 50. 
16 British imports from the United States for the years 1854-1 861 were 
287.3 million British pounds. The next most important trading partner was 
the British East Indies who exported a distant 126.7 million British pounds 
8 
to Britain. Of the U.S. exports, the South dominated. Of the 287.3 million 
British pounds, 200 million were spent on Southern exports, largely cotton, 
tobacco, and rice. Of all the cotton that landed in Britain in 1860, 85% was 
from the American South. For greater coverage of British dependence on 
American goods see the first few chapters of Crook, D.P., The North. the 
If the United States [is] determined to stop by force so 
important a commerce as that of Great Britain with the 
cotton-growing States, I could not answer for what might 
happen .... It placed Foreign Powers in the dilemma of 
recognizing the Southern Confederation or of submitting to 
the interruption of their commerce.l7 
9 
The blockade dispute began before Adams arrived in Britain and 
before anyone in London could pacify growing British opposition to the 
North. Not surprisingly, then, when Adams arrived there was already a 
steady departure of steamers from Britain with supplies for the Confederacy. 
When Adams confronted Lord Russell with evidence of this commerce with 
the Confederacy, Russell claimed to be unaware of such naval actions. And 
when he confronted Russell about supplying the South with ships, Russell hid 
behind the Foreign Enlistment Act of 1819. 
Perhaps nothing frustrated Adams more than British manipulation of 
the Foreign Enlistment Act. The Act was designed to prohibit the 
manufacture of vessels in British ports for bellicose excursions--especially 
excursions against friendly powers. Adams constantly reminded Russell of 
this, pressuring him with threats of U.S. retaliation against England's blatant 
disregard of its own law .18 
Adams's frustration and England's excuse rested in the wording of the 
Act. It forbade British subjects from the "equipping, furnishing, fitting out, or 
South, and the Powers: 1861-1865. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 
1974.) 
17 Russell Papers. Otd. in Adams, E.D., pp. 64-5. 
1s From the moment Adams arrived until the days before he left England 
seven years later, he tirelessly worked to correct the abuse of British 
neutrality law. 
arming of any ship or vessel, with intent or in order that such ship or vessel 
shall be employed in the service" of a belligerent power. It also provided 
punishment of individuals and confiscation of vessels if the Act were 
disobeyed. It further stated that this punishment and seizure should follow 
proof of the offense. 
10 
Unfortunately, for the Union, nothing in the Act made it illegal to build 
a warship as one operation, and to purchase munitions to equip that vessel as 
another operation. Ifboth of these things occurred separately and "happened" 
to come together, this combination constituted no violation of the law, if 
joining of the two (warship with munitions) took place outside British waters. 
This blatant evasion of the letter of the law was not even questioned by 
most in England in July 1862. In fact, many considered this technical 
maneuvering "an exceeding good joke." 19 After all, the majority were 
sympathizing with the Confederacy and were not even suspicious of war 
vessels being built with intent for service to the Confederates. 
Jefferson Davis's brilliant agent, J.D. Bulloch, operated the 
Confederate maneuvers in England, working the system to perfection. Even 
when Thomas Dudley, U.S. consul at Liverpool, equipped Adams with 
evidence of "furnishing, fitting out, and arming" of ships for the Confederacy 
and Adams bombarded the Foreign Office with the information, the British 
government could do nothing. Government officials required proof of illegal 
activity prior to seizure of vessels and punishment of offending parties. Proof 
was hard to get prior to an offense. But Adams remained relentless, 
continually attacking Russell and the British Parliament for neglecting 
maritime law. 
19 Charles Francis Adams Jr. Charles Francis Adams. {Boston: The 
Riverside Press, 1900), p. 308. 
Despite Adams's protest, the British ironclad Oreto left Liverpool 
March 22, 1862. Leaving with the destination of "Palmero, the 
Mediterranean, and Jamaica," proof of use against the North 
11 
was insufficient.20 Three months later, when the Oreto docked at Nassau, 
took on munitions, and prepared for Confederate service, it was too late. 
Over the next two years, as the Florida, it captured thirty-eight ships, costing 
the Union ten times the Florida's own cost. 
In July of 1862, another, more formidable ironclad quietly left 
Liverpool. And despite evidence that the "290" (later named the Alabama) 
was "on the same errand" as previous ships, no one stopped its departure.21 
During a twenty-two month life on the seas, the Alabama captured, 
destroyed, or ransomed sixty-four Union ships.22 
Throughout the Alabama's manufacture, departure, and success on the 
seas, Adams applied pressure on the British government. He sent for an 
American ship, the Tuscarora, to intercept the "290" if it departed. He 
instructed Dudley to send evidence of the ships warlike intentions to the 
Collector of Customs in Liverpool. He employed legal advice from Judge 
and Queen's Counsel Robert Collier. He began his famous "Alabama 
correspondence" with Russell. Consistently issuing dispatches to the Foreign 
office attacking its shortcomings and refusal to act justly, Adams tenaciously 
increased pressure on the Palmerston government. Defending the Foreign 
Office and calling the accusations unprovable and unfair, Russell refuted the 
20 Adams, E.D., p. 118 
21 Bernard. Neutrality of Great Britain During the American Civil War, 
p.338-9 . Otd. in Adams, E.D., p. 118. 
22 Merli, F.J. Great Britain and the Confederate Navv: 1861-65. 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1970), p. 95. Also see Howarth, 
Stephen. To Shining Sea: A History of the United States Navv. 1775-1991. 
(New York: Random House, 1991), p 196. 
12 
claims.23 When the correspondence was published in the London papers, 
Adams increased his demands, calling for full payment for the ruin the 
Alabama and other commerce-destroyers inflicted on the United States. For 
every ship the Alabama destroyed, the reparation he claimed from the British 
government increased. 
Despite initial refusal to acquiesce, Russell worried when Queen's 
Counsel Collier sided with Adams and Adams promised increased U.S. 
response if further rams left port to aid the South. The relentless pressure 
was working. Although gaining nothing immediate on the Alabama question, 
Adams won leverage for future confrontations. 
America was fortunate Adams had this leverage, for Adams now faced 
the biggest diplomatic crisis of his ministership. Weeks before the Alabama 
departed, instructions reached Captain J.D. Bulloch to arrange a contract for 
building two more ironclad ships of war. Bulloch was to offer one million 
dollars cash, up front, and an additional million later on. In July, work on the 
ships begun. 
These rams, contracted with the Lairds' shipyard of Birkenhead, were 
different from previous rams. Weighing two tons and extending two-hundred 
forty feet, they were equipped with a forty-two feet beam, and most 
importantly, a "piercer." Extending seven feet in front of the ship, the 
"piercer" lay four feet under the water and was deadly to wooden ships. 
Reaching ten knots under 350 horse power, the Laird rams would be 
unmatched on the seas.24 
23 Parliamentary Papers, 1863. Qtd. in Adams, E.D .. , p.119. 
24 Melton, Maurice. The Confederate Ironclads. (New York: Thomas 
Yoseloff Publishers, 1968.), 255. 
13 
Acting together, the ships were to break the Northern blockade and 
secure Confederate recognition. The munitions industry promised that the 
rams were "so formidable a character" that nothing could prevent their 
success and efficiency in breaking a Union blockade.25 Realizing this, 
Confederate Secretary ofNavy S.R. Mallory wrote to his consul, John Slidell, 
on the twenty-seventh of March: "Our early possession of these ships ... is. 
. . of such paramount importance to our country that no effort, no sacrifice 
must be spared to accomplish it."26 
The Union Naval Department responded with equal alarm. "You must 
stop [the Laird rams] at all hazards," Captain Fox, Assistant Secretary of the 
Union Navy wrote Adams. "We have no defense against them .... We have 
not one [gun] in the whole country fit to fire at [it]. ... It is a matter of life 
and death." The burden of stopping the Lairds fell on Charles.27 
In March of 1863, Adams confronted Russell, attacking England's 
negligence in adhering to her neutrality laws. He presented the recently 
passed U.S. "Privateering Bill,'' threatening its realization if Britain continued 
manufacturing vessels for the South.28 Russell, taking the threat seriously, 
replied that "they [Britain] should do what they could [to prevent illegal 
outfitting], but the [Enlistment Act] law was difficult to execute and they 
could not go beyond it. "29 
Adams left the meeting with hope. But subsequent Parliamentary 
debate and public applause for a speech by Laird defending his conduct 
2s Jenkins, Brian . Britain and the War for the Union. vol. 2. (Montreal: 
MeGill-Queen's University Press), p.289. 
26 Otd. in Adams, Jr. , C.F., p.319. 
27 Otd. in Adams, Jr., C.F., p. 321. 
2s Duberman, p.302. 
29 C.F .A. Diary March 26, 1863. Otd. in Duberman, p.303. 
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proved equally discouraging. Even Palmerston defended the government's 
actions, affinning its lawful observance of the Enlistment Act in the Alabama 
case and in all others. Adams was furious, branding Palmerston a ''rancorous 
hater of America. "30 Hopes for preventing the Laird rams from departing 
now seemed dim. Henry Adams, Charles's son and secretary in England, 
wrote home. "Any number of Alabamas may now be built, equipped, manned 
and despatched from British ports. "31 
Adams's hopes were further darkened by the outcome in the Alexandra 
affair. On April 5, Russell ordered seizure of the British ram Alexandra on 
the grounds of violating the Enlistment Act. Upon trial of government action 
in seizing the ship, a verdict indicted the government for illegal seizure. 
Because the vessel was not armed at departure, no proof that it was a warship 
existed. For Adams, the implication was ominous. Since the ram should not 
have been stopped, future rams like it also should not be stopped. Adams 
knew he needed greater proof of the Lairds' intent or a stronger threat of war 
with the U.S. if he was to stop the rams departure. 
ill 
hnmediately Adams put his "well-knit, far-reaching, effective 
espionage system" to work.32 The Lairds were just months away from 
completion and intense pressure had to be put on the government to seize the 
rams. After the Southern defeats at Vicksburg and Gettysburg, Adams 
30 C.F.A. Diarv, February 28, 1863, Otd. in Duberman, p. 303. 
31 Ford, W.C. ed. A Cycle of Adams Letters: 1861-1865. vol. 2 {Boston: 
The Riverside Press, 1920), p. 39. A letter from Henry Adams to Charles 
Francis Adams, Jr. on June 25, 1863. 
32 Melton, p. 259. 
15 
confronted the Foreign Office.33 On July 7, Dudley applied to customs 
officials to seize the rams because they were being made ready "to cruise 
against the Government and citizens of the United States. "34 Securing 
further evidence from Dudley, in July Adams again went to Russell with 
evidence pertaining to the destination of the rams.35 The work for which the 
vessels were designed was well known to the government. Men, munitions, 
money, and the two ships were all present at the same port the notorious 
Alabama had left from. Confederate agent J.D. Bulloch was spending 
significant time at the shipyards, and work on the rams was rapidly nearly 
completion. 
Adams sent further affidavits to Russell on August 14 and September 
3. His letter on the third again pointed out that the rams were fitted "for war 
against the United States. n36 Still the government had no proof of the Lairds' 
intent, Russell insisted in a letter to Adams on the fourth. Adams answered 
the next day, "I trust I need not express how profound is my regret at the 
33 Gettysburg and Vicksburg had an enormous effect on British attitude 
toward Confederate recognition. In a letter dated July 24, 1863 to his son, 
Charles Francis Adams wrote, "It sounds the knell of the confederation 
scheme. Great has been the disappointment and consternation here! Just 
at the moment, too, when they were hoping and believing its complete 
establishment and recognition at hand." As a result of Vicksburg and 
Gettysburg, Prime Minister Palmerston was much more reticent to recognize 
the Confederacy. 
34 Home Office, 45/7261, Dudley-Edwards, July 7, 1863. Otd. in Merli, 
196. 
35 D.P. Crook, p.324; E.D. Adams, vol. 2, p. 144; Duberman, p. 31 0; and 
C.F.A. Diary, July 8-11, 1863 confirm this . Other pages from these sources 
also give support. 
36 Charles Francis Adams to Russell, September 3, 1863. Otd. in Duberman, 
p. 311. 
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conclusion to which her Majesty's Government have arrived . . . . It would be 
superfluous in me to point out to your Lordship that this is war. "37 
Unknown to Adams, two days earlier, on September 3, Russell had 
telegraphed his assistant, Austin H . Layard, to detain the rams if they seemed 
ready to depart. 38 In fact for several months Russell had been keeping close 
watch over the progress of the Lairds and was preparing to stifle their 
departure. 3 9 
For this reason, some scholars suggest that the rams' fate was sealed 
regardless of Adams's action. Because England realized the Lairds' departure 
meant war with the North, they were not going to let the rams leave the 
shipyards--especially after the Union victories at Vicksburg and Gettysburg. 
Besides, England had more to worry about: the Polish Rebellion, French 
motives, U.S. strength, Canadian security, and internal division.40 Perhaps 
this is why in January of 1863, Bulloch admitted, "the hope of getting the 
ships out seems more than doubtful--indeed hopeless. "41 
It is undeniable, however, that Adams vociferous objections to the 
rams' departure influenced English decision. If the September crisis was not 
as intense as initially perceived, it was only because Adams had, throughout 
the war, been a constant reminder to Russell of American concern with 
British interference. Had Britain felt less opposition, the economic advantage 
of using the Lairds would have dictated British allowance of their departure. 
37 Charles Francis Adams to Russell, September 5, 1863. This famous 
remark is quoted in numerous sources including Merli, Duberman, and 
Crook. 
38 Merli, p.202. 
39 Jenkins, p. 289. 
40 E.D. Adams in Great Britain and the American Civil War and Brian 
Jenkins, in Britain and the War for the Union provide the best coverage of 
alternate British concerns. 
41 Otd. in Adams Jr., p. 324. 
17 
But Bulloch was unsure he could get the Laird rams out of British port. 
Adams's steady pressure had made the Palmerston government cautious and 
reluctant to see the rams escape. Henry Adams maintained that consistent 
pressure brought on the Foreign Office was not "unproductive of results. "42 
Historian Brian Jenkins admits the government was leery of another Alabama 
affair and Adams's relentless attacks "could not be overlooked. "43 Years 
later Parliament acknowledged Adams for his services during the tense 
crisis. 44 The London Times applauded him for his "wise discretion and cool 
judgment. "45 Lord Russell credited him for admirable service to the two 
countries. Even Seward gave Adams a "very handsome tribute. "46 
Describing his own role, Adams wrote to his son Charles: 
All the little I have contributed to this result has been to 
nourish by a steady and uniform bearing . . . the growth of 
this opinion [that the U.S. would go to war with Britain if 
the rams were not permanently detained by] the British 
Cabinet.47 
In early October of 1863, Russell sent orders for the government to not 
only detain the ships, but to seize them. Seizure marked the final failure of 
the confederacy to change Union control in American waters. Mallory 
believed the seizure was " a great national misfortune. "48 Henry Adams 
called the victory "a second Vicksburg, the ... crowning stroke of our 
42 Adams, Jr., Charles Francis, p. HELP. 
43 Jenkins, p. 298. 
44 Duberman, p. 320. 
45 The Times, February 29, 1868. Otd. in Duberman, p.330. 
46 Duberman, p. 331. 
47 Cycle of Adams Letters. Charles Francis Adams to his son, November 
25, 1863. 
48 Qtd. in Adams, Jr., p. 320 
diplomacy. "49 Historians conclude it was the South's final diplomatic 
demise, their last chance to gain foreign recognition. 50 
IV 
18 
Today, historians cite many reasons why Britain remained officially 
neutral during the American Civil War. 51 Adams's congenial relationship 
and constant contact with British leaders remains a paramount reason. For 
over three years, Adams safeguarded the U.S. from formal British 
intervention in the war. He engendered a closer British watch over neutrality 
laws and hindered numerous ships from quick departure for Confederate 
shores. 
In October of 1863, Adams could pause. His tireless diplomacy had 
triumphed. With the help ofUnion victories on the battlefield, Adams 
challenged Palmerston's government and thwarted the last realistic 
Confederate hope for foreign recognition. Now Lincoln really did have little 
to worry about concerning British intervention. 
Over twenty years later James Russell Lowell, U.S . minister to 
England from 1877-85, said of Adams: 
49 A Cycle of Adams Letters. Henry Adams to Charles Francis Adams, Jr., 
September 16, 1863. 
so Numerous sources support this including Merli, Crook, Jenkins, and 
Adams. 
51Among many other reasons these are included: Britain was disenchanted 
with interventionist policies, Parliament was still coping with leadership 
changes, America (North and South) remained a vital commercial partner, 
and troubles in Europe demanded their attention. 
None of our generals in the field, not Grant himself, did 
us better or more trying service than he in his forlorn 
outpost of London. s2 
Lowell puts it aptly. 
52Qtd. in Adams, Jr., p. 345. 
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Bibliographic Essay 
In researching my subject I focused on two major questions: How did 
Charles Francis Adams influence the outcome of the Laird rams crisis and 
what were the significant forces that shaped his role in negotiating with the 
Palmerston government. 
20 
While McKee Library on the campus of Southern College was my base 
of research, the Massachusetts Historical Society and the Library at the 
University of Tennessee-Knoxville provided me with invaluable sources. For 
reliable study on the forces shaping Adams, perhaps no source is better than 
Charles's own diary. Adams's faithful entries provide revealing information 
and fantastic insight into his character. Two other sources, The Cycle of 
Adams Letters and Charles Francis Adams, by his son, provide the next best 
insight into Adams's mind. The best biography on Adams's life is by Martin 
Duberman. His work is extensively researched and provides a clear look at 
Adams the man. 
For understanding the role Adams played in keeping the Laird rams 
from leaving for America, I found three books most helpful. Great Britain 
and the American Civil War, by E.D. Adams, The North, the South, and the 
Powers, by D.P. Crook, and Britain & the War for the Union, by Brian 
Jenkins. All three of these are towering works shedding definitive light on the 
diplomatic crisis. 
Other works, the Russell Papers, Parliamentary Papers, Great Britain 
and the Confederate Nayy, by Frank Merli, and The Confederate Ironclads by 
Maurice Melton were also very helpful supplementary works in beefing up 
the argument and shedding light on the diplomatic situation during the Civil 
War. 
The sources I used for this study are by no means exhaustive of the 
numerous documents and papers on Adams's role in the Laird rams crisis. 
My study simply wets the appetite for deeper study into this American 
diplomat. 
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